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Abstract 
Now is the time to revisit the use of the Space 
Shuttle to implement the DoD policy of dual 
access to space. The Shuttle Program is in 
transition, improving its operational 
responsiveness and reducing its costs to 
satisfy customer requirements. Many key 
Shuule Program management positions are 
held by people with DoD spacelift 
experience. NASA's way of doing business is 
. being changed to make programs happen 
quicker, faster, and cheaper. Shuttle cosrs 
have been reduced by more than 25 percem 
since 1991. Funher consolidation and 
streamlining of Shuttle operations can be 
implemented to reduce recurring costs to as 
low as $2.0 billion, down over $1.5 billion 
from today's operations costs. Shuule 
processing has been improved to the point 
that the current four Orbiter fleet could easily 
support twelve flights per year, up four over 
today's flight manifest. The Shuttle provides 
the DoD with a backup launch capability for 
larger payloads which is much more reliable 
and less costly than the Titan IV. In addition, 
the Space Shuule provides the DoD with 
many unique spacelift capabilities nOl 
available from the expendable launch vehicle 
fleet. The decision prior to the Challenger 
accident to move the preponderance of the 
payloads to Shuttle was just as incorrect as 
the decision after the Challenger accident to 
remove all DoD and commercial payloads 
from Shuttle. This paper will present how the 
Space Shuttle can become DoD's cost 
effective solution to dual access to space and 
the benefits the DoD will accrue from 
.utilizing the Shuttle as a spacelift asset. 
Background 
The DoD has played a major role in the 
development of the Space Shuttle. Many 
program requirements were DoD derived 
such as polar orbit, 1100 NM cross range 
capability for polar orbit return, and a payload 
bay 60 feet in length and 15 feet in diameter. 
Early Shuttle manifests averaged two DoD 
flights per year from the Eastern Test Range 
(ETR). A launch site was developed at the 
Western Test Range (WTR) co suppon polar 
launches. Shuttle Orbiter OV·103 was 
designated as the Vandenberg Orbiter. 
However, space policy decisions led DoD to 
remove operational payloads from the Shuttle. 
The Shuttle was perceived as being expensive 
and comple11:. NASA controlled the launch 
process, established launch priority, and 
reserved final approval of crew selection. The 
payload manifesting cycle and integration 
processes were perceived as too long and 
complicated. The Challenger accident, and the 
resultant stand down demonsrrated the need for 
dual access to space. The subsequent 
prohibition of Centaur upper stages on the 
Shuttle limited the number of DoD missions 
that could be flown on the Shuttle. The 
decision to not activate the SLC·6 complex at 
the WTR reduced the Shuttle's ability to satisfy 
DoD payload mission requirements. But even 
with these limiiations, the Shuttle has proven 
its ability to support DoD and national 
payloads. 
... 
The Case For Shutlle 
With the recent Titan IV and Atlas launch 
vehicle problems, and the maturing of the 
Shuttle system, it seems appropriate to 
readdress the issues that precipitated the 
departure of the DoD from the Shuttle. 
Additionally, with the severe budget 
constraints being placed on DoD programs, a 
"use what's available" philosophy provides a 
cost-effective alternative to a "dedicated 
system" approach. Just as Dcscn Storm 
demonstrated that commercial airlines and 
commercial GPS receivers could effectively 
augment dedicated DoD assets, a routinely 
flying Shuttle could augment DoD launch 
assets. With the activation of the Space 
Warfare Center and its focus on space 
applications, the Shuttle offers what no ELY 
can match - a space-based tactics and test lab 
with man-in-the-loop. 
The Shuttle program is in transition, 
improving the operational responsiveness and 
reducing costs to satisfy the needs of 
customers. Organizational changes at each 
related NASA center and Headquarters are 
being made. Many key Shuttle program 
positions are filled by people with DoD 
space-lift experience. The way of doing 
business is being changed to make things 
happen quicker, faster and cheaper. 
The Space Shuttle system provides unique 
capabilities as the nation's premier heavy-lift 
launch system. Of primary benefit are its 
capability to deliver up to 58 klb to low earth 
orbit, its ability to act as an orbital test bed for 
a wide variety of experiments and missions, 
and its capability to operate at inclinations 
from 28 to 63 degrees. The Shuttle can stay 
on orbit for up to 16 days (28 days with the 
Long Duration Orbiter upgrade kit) and it can 
be configured with several variations of 
labora!ories for specified missions. The 
Hubble repair mission validated the Shuttle's 
capability to perform on-orbit checkout, 
maintenance and repair of high-value 
payloads. Potential Shuttle upgrades that will 
enhance operations and improve mission 
capability include controls and displays 
upgrades, GPS navigation, electro-mechanical 
actuators, rugged thermal protection systems, 
standard payload interface and vehicle health 
management. Figure 1 shows many of the 
potential performance upgrades under 
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Figure I. Potential Performance 
Improvements 
consideration to improve the Shuttle payload 
capability by 15,500 pounds to deploy and 
service the Global Space Station at an 
inclination of 51.6 degrees. The Shuttle can 
deliver a valuable payload to orbit, check it 
out, make any necessary repairs and deploy 
the payload. Retrieved payloads can be placed 
into the payload bay for return to eanh. 
The Space Shuttle has the highest launch 
vehicle success rate when compared to today's 
operational expendable launch vehicles 
(Table I). The Saturn launch vehicle which 
used the same design approach as the Space 
Shuttle had a 100 percent launch success rate. 
Eleven of the 57 successful launches have 
been dedicated DoD missions, the latest being 
STS-53, which flew in December 1992. 
Numerous secondary payloads have flown in 
the payload bay, in the aft flight deck and as 
hand-held experiments operated by military· 
trained astronauts. Shuttle DoD experiments 
have included earth-surface object 
identification, space object tracking and 
various communications tests. 
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LAUNCH % VEHICLE 
Shuttle 98.3 
Delta 94.6 
Ariane 91.8 
Titan 34B, 11, 111 91.1 
Proton 88.3 
Scout 87.9 
Titan IV 85.7 
Long March 83.3 
Atlas 80.2 
Table I. Shuttle Has Highest Launch Success 
Rate 
The Shuttle has a better on-time launch record 
than the expendable launch vehicles (Figure 
2). An attempt was made to apply the same 
Figure 2. Shuttle Has Better On-Time Launch 
Record Than ELVs 
definition for "launch delay"- any delay after 
the launch vehicle has arrived at the launch 
pad that prevents the launch from occurring 
on the scheduled day-to both ELY s and the 
Shuttle. Since the EL V data did not always 
specify when the launch date was established, 
all delays may not have been considered. Of 
the fifty-seven Shuttle flights from STS-1 
through STS-51, thirty-five have been 
successfully launched in one launch attempt 
and founeen others in two attempts. Twcnty-
seven of the Shunle launch delays to later in 
the same day or scrubs to another day were 
cause.d by weather. Some of the weather 
violations were at the world-wide abort sites 
necessary for the safe return of the crew. It is 
inappropriate to consider those weather 
related delays or scrubs when comparing 
Shuttle to ELY launch-on-time performance. 
Safe return of the crew and payload is a small 
price to pay for occasional delays or scrubs. 
Additionally, each Shuttle flight element 
contractor has reassessed and refined launch 
constraint redlines to improve launch 
probability. Furthermore, the program has 
minimized violations of winds aloft criteria 
by recently implementing a day-of-launch l-
load update (DOLILU) capability which 
further improves launch probability. The 
implementation of these improvemencs has 
led to an overall launch probability 
consistently in excess of 90%. 
The Space Shuttle provides competitive cargo 
cost into orbit. As indicated in Figure 3, the 
Shuttle cost ($/lb.) to LEO is less than Titan 
IV and competitive with Atlas and Ariane. 
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Figure 3. Shuttle Provides Competitive Cargo 
Cost Into Orbit 
While accurate and comparable costs are 
difficult to determine, there is no conflict over 
cost trends. Shuttle costs have been coming 
down while Titan IV costs have increased. 
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The cost ranges reflect expected variations in 
flight rates per year of the Shuttle and 
variations in production runs and payload 
integration complexity for the ELVs. Lower 
flight rates result in higher cost/lb. to LEO 
because fixed costs are spread over fewer 
flights. Conversely, higher flight rates result 
in lower cost/lb. The fixed costs dominate at 
low launch rates (Figure 4). As the flight rate 
increases from 8 per year to 12 per year, the 
recurring costs increase only by $407M 
($3,359M for 8 flights to $3,766M for 12 
flights). At the same time, the average cost 
per flight decreases from $420M (for 8 
flights) to $314M (for 12 flights) and the cost 
per pound decreases from $6,667M (for 8 
flights) to $4,984 (for 12 flights). 
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Figure 4. Fixed Infrastructure Drives Total 
Recurring Costs 
Additional cost reductions can be achieved to 
make the Shuttle system even more cost 
effective. The Shuttle launch operations 
concept should be mod.ified to initiate a long 
range operations cost reduction plan leading 
to an industrial STS operator (Figure 5): The 
first step is the consolidation of NASA 
contractor roles and the elimination of 
duplicate effort across all Shuttle operations 
contracts. The elimination of duplicate launch 
support services significantly reduces 
manpower and provides a direct link from 
Shuttle element processor to Shuttle element 
designer. It eliminates at least one layer of 
oversight and removes the inefficiency that 
goes with multiple contractor interfaces and 
the hand off of technical issues. Additional 
Figure 5. Shuttle Operations Cost Can Be 
Reduced To At Least $2.0B 
consolidation of support contracts and 
elimination of duplicate effort will lead to 
significant Shuttle operations cost reductions 
and still maintain hardware reliability and 
safety. 
NASA must manage program milestones and 
the contractors on a mission contract basis. 
Shuttle management responsibilities should 
incrementally transition to an industrial 
Shuttle Operator with NASA retaining top 
level control and with a single contractor held 
accountable for Shuttle operation. 
Redundancies between the civil servants, 
element contractors, processing contractors, 
arid support services contractors could be 
significantly reduced, if not eliminated. 
Consolidation of duplicate effort and turning 
day-to-day Shuttle operations over to an 
industrial operator could reduce Shuttle non-
hardware operations costs by at least $1.58 
per year. 
The NASA is significantly improving the 
Shuttle flight rate capability. The typical 
turnaround time (TAT) for a 1992 Shuttle 
flight (Figure 6) was 134 days (DRFC 7, OPF 
83, V AB 7 and Pad 37). Several actions 
being implemented have improved this 
schedule. Landing at KSC saves 7 days. At 
the OPF, use of standardized and streamlined 
flows, expansion of fair wear-and-tear 
specifications, increased use of in-flight 
checkout, and use of manifesting techniques 
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Figure 6. Turnaround Time Is Being 
Significantly Reduced 
to minimize reconfiguration are helping reach 
the goal of a 51-day typical processing time 
by 1995. In the YAB and on the pad, 
combining operations, improving test 
effectiveness, and using dedicated teams, as 
well as standard flows, are helping reduce the 
typical time from 44 to 27 days. These actions 
will enable a theoretical flight rate greater 
than 16 per year with a four-Orbiter fleet. 
Even after allowing for Orbiter down-time, 
unequally spaced missions, weather, and other 
contingencies, a realistic flight rate of 12 per 
year is achievable, opening up at least 4 
flights per year for DoD. 
The Shuttle Launch-On-Nec.d (LON) 
capability was required by and planned for by 
the DoD. Currently, the only planned LON is 
a Hubble Telescope repair mission which can 
be flown within 12 months of ca11-up. A 
payload with less complex requirements could 
be called up on a shoncr timeline. For a 
payload to be classified as an LON payload, 
1) its integration cycle must be complete; 2) 
all operational documentation must be 
developed and on the shelf; 3) the ground 
flow must be validated by pathfinder or 
analytically; and, 4) no configuration changes 
are allowed that would invalidate the safety or 
integration processes. If a payload can be 
stored at the launch site, time will be saved in 
ground processing. How quickly a LON 
payload can be launched depends on where 
the Shuttle Orbiter is in its turnaround cycle. 
Figure 7 shows the various scenarios for 
inserting a LON payload. As shown, the 
shonest time to launch will be achieved if the 
call-up occurs at the stan of the up-mission 
processing (UMPS). Under that condition, the 
payload can be launched in 75 days. The 
worst scenarios are those that occur just as the 
Orbiter lands, or when the Shuttle is at the 
pad with a payload which must be removed to 
accommodate the LON payload. Under those 
scenarios, launch could not occur for 96 days . 
Additional timeline improvements could be 
achieved for payloads with a minimum of 
software and hardware interfaces with the 
Shuttle. 
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Figure 7. LON Processing Flow Options 
The decision to ban payloads requiring a 
Centaur upper stage after the Challenger 
accident was a response to the inherent 
additional danger to the crew posed by high 
energy liquid propellant upper stages. The 
hardware system to accommodate a Centaur 
stage exists and was, in fact, scheduled to be 
installed for the next flight following the 
Challenger accident. The only constraint to 
flying a Centaur class payload is the presence 
of the crew. Several studies have looked at 
flying the Shuttle without the crew. Two 
types of crew-less configurations could be 
developed. One implements an Automated 
&-13 
Orbiter Kit (AOK) and the other provides a 
Reusable Cargo Vehicle (RCV). The AOK 
provides an automaied mission kit in the crew 
module that performs normal crew functions 
but does not substantially change the Orbiter 
configuration. Payload lift capability is 
increased by 10,000 to 12,500 pounds by the 
removal of the crew and selected crew 
equipment. The RCV concept removes all 
crew unique systems thereby saving weight 
and improving performance by over 20,000 
pounds. The RCV cost and schedule is 
essentially the same as a new Orbiter. 
Typical of upper stages which can be used to 
launch DoD payloads from the Shuttle 
nominal parking orbit is the IRIS. IRIS was 
developed by Alenia Spazio for the Italian 
Space Agency to launch LAGEOS 2 into a 
5900 Km orbit at a 52 degree inclination. The 
IRIS system is designed to inject a 900 kg 
mass payload into geostationary transfer orbit, 
starting from the Shuttle nominal parking 
orbit. Figure 8 gives the performance 
characteristics of the IRIS launched from a 
standard Shuttle orbit. 
Figure 8. IRIS Payload Capability From 
Standard Shuttle Orbit 
The cost of designing payloads for dual 
launch system capability has been perceived 
as an issue. Since the induced environments 
for Shuttle and Titan IV are essentially the 
same, with Shuttle being slightly more 
benign, the added cost of designing payloads 
to fly on Shuttle as well as ELVs is related to 
physically adapting the payload and designing 
systems that are man-rated in terms of safety, 
redundancy and reliability Some payloads are 
dual compatible now. DSP has flown on 
Shuttle and may be flown on it again. GPS 
was originally designed to fly on Shuttle. 
Some national asset payloads may be Shuttle 
compatible. Payloads utilizing tuS or PAM 
upper stages should require minimal change. 
The impact on new development payloads 
would be minimal since in-line design would 
avoid the high cost of redesign and 
recertification. A cradle can be developed 
which will adapt Titan IV payloads to Shuttle 
so that the payloads would be able to fly on 
either system without design change. Similar 
"launch vehicle simulators" might be worth 
investigating for Atlas and Delta class 
payloads. 
Another perceived impediment to launching 
DoD payloads on Shuttle is the reduction in 
Shuttle security. The DoD terminated full 
control mode for Shuttle missions with STS-
38 as a cost avoidance. Security constraints 
on the integration process for the flights of 
AFP-675, IBSS, and STP-1 on STS-39 and 
the flight of DSP on STS-44 were waived by 
the DoD. Detailed payload capabilities and 
test results remained classified. No security 
problems were encountered on those 
missions. Prior to STS-53, which flew the 
DoD-1 payload, security requirements were 
relaxed under the DoD Secure Shuttle 
Operations (OSSO) concept. That flight 
demonstrated that economical and adequate 
security measures are still in place to protect 
national interests. 
Summary 
Revisiting the use of the Space Shuttle to 
ensure access to space for national priority 
payloads is wonhwhile. Capability, reliability, 
affordability, and responsiveness are all 
attributes of today's Space Shuttle system. The 
definition of our nation's DoD priorities, 
coupled with the "new NASA", supports the 
need to re-ex;amine the military's use of 
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Shuttle. Noc only is the currenc manifesc 
supportive of increased DoD use, but NASA's 
new cuhure better accommodates the mutual 
resolution of technical and programmatic 
issues. The current administrative policies that 
restrict DoD use of Shuttle need to be 
addressed and updated. The Shuttle is a 
national asset. The question is not whether the 
nation should have a Shuttle - it is here. The 
real question is how can the DoD quickly and 
cost effectively execute its space mission. 
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